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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
engaged in a compromise between total immunity and the doctrine of respondeat
superior,18 resulting in the distinction between medical and administrative acts.19
Becker v. City of New York added more confusion by holding in substance that
the state and its subdivisions' liability was greater than a private hospitals'.
However, full cycle was finally reached, the Court in Bing v. Thunig discarding
the notion that the determination of whether a doctor or a nurse is an employee
depended on the nature of the acts performed rather than on the relationship
between the hospital and the nurse or doctor. As a result, there is no longer a
privilege for any type of hospital, whether state, charitable, or profit-making,
nor any necessity for making nice distinctions as to the nature of the act. The
Court upset precedent of many years to, ".... bring the common law of this state,
on this question, into accord with justice .... 20
Non Enforceability Of Joint Venfure
"When individuals determine to conduct business through a corporation, ...
they are not at one and same time joint venturers and stockholders, fiduciaries and
nonfiduciaries, personally liable and not personally liable." This is the declaration
of the Court in Weisman v. Awnair Corporation of America,21 affirming the
Appellate Division's reversal 2 of an order of Supreme Court denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff brought an action for an injunction and an accounting against a
manufacturing corporation, its wholly-owned subsidiary distributing corporation,
and two individual defendants who were officers, directors and stockholders in the
manufacturing corporation, and with whom plaintiff had made an agreement that
he would organize a corporation which would be given the exclusive right to
distribute the manufacturer's product in a certain territory, the stock in the new
corporation to be issued sixty per cent to him and forty per cent to the individual
defendants or their nominees. He had organized the corporation and it had
operated for some time when the manufacturing corporation, on about seven
weeks notice, ceased to supply the new corporation with its products and proceeded
to market them in the area through an newly-organized wholly-owned subsidiary
The Court said that the facts pleaded in the complaint indicated only the
existence of a joint venture among three individuals, no corporation being a party
to it, and that this joint venture could not be carried on by individuals through
18. Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hov.'itals in New York, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 419,
438 (1952).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1951).
21. 3 N.Y.2d 444, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1957).
22. 2 A.D.2d 685, 152 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1956).
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a corporate form. Thus plaintiff's grounds for equitable relief, the violation of a
fiduciary duty, fail.
Judge Desmond dissented, arguing that the complaint alleged that the indi-
vidual defendants, parties to the joint venture, had refused to go on with the
project, and had caused the local distributorship to be given to a different corpora-
tion, and that such defection constituted a cause of action.
On the facts as they appear in the complaint, it would seem that equity here
is electing to escape a traditional duty by seizing upon a rule of corporation law
of dubious applicability. As Judge Desmond points out in his dissent, the cases
cited by the majority opinion23 merely "state the familiar rule that when one puts
his interests into a corporation he cannot thereafter enforce the corporation's
claims or deal with its property as if he were a sole owner or a partner."2 4 It is
submitted that in this case the individual plaintiff might be viewed for purposes
of equity as seeking to enforce not the corporation's claims, but his own individual
claim as a joint venturer. Judge Desmond points up the implications of the
majority view: "We are asked to hold here that individuals agreeing to go into
business together and to carry out that business through a corporation cannot
enforce such an agreement. Not only is there nothing illegal about such a plan
but I venture to say it is one of the commonest of modern day business
arrangements"
25
23. See, e.g., Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y. 387, 111 N.E. 229 (1915); Crespl v.
Crespi, 238 App. Div. 794, 262 N.Y. Supp. 910 (mere., 2d Dep't 1933); Seigel v. Lieb-
owitz, 230 App. Div. 736, 243 N.Y. Supp. 842 (mem., 2d Dep't 1930).
24. 3 N.Y.2d at 451, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
25. Id. at 452, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
